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In this paper the correct calculations of the mutual information of the whole trans-
mission, the quantum bit error rate (QBER) are presented. Mistakes of the general
conclusions relative to the mutual information, the quantum bit error rate (QBER) and
the security in Wo´jcik’s paper [Phys. Rev. Lett. 90, 157901(2003)] have been pointed
out.
PACS Number(s): 03.67.Hk, 03.65.Ud
After the pioneering work of Bennett and Brassard published in 1984[1], a variety of quantum
secret communication protocols have been proposed( for a review see [2]). Recently, a quite dif-
ferent quantum cryptographic protocol (namely, the ’ping-pong’ protocol) has been proposed by
Bostro¨m and Felbinger[3], which allows the generation of a deterministic key or even direct secret
communication. The protocol has been claimed to be secure and experimentally feasible. However,
since the security of the ’ping-pong’ protocol can be impaired as far as considerable quantum losses
are taken into account, very recently Wo´jcik has presented an undetectable eavesdropping scheme
on the ’ping-pong’ protocol[4]. The aims of this paper are as follows: (1) to present the correct
calculations of various mutual information (i.e., the mutual information between the legitimate
sender (Alice) and the legitimate receiver (Bob) and the mutual information between Alice and the
eavesdropper (Eve)) and the quantum bit error rates (QBERs, i.e., Bob’s BQER and Eve’s QBER);
(2) to point out the mistakes relative to the mutual information, the QBERs and the security in
Wo´jcik’s paper and correct them.
Since Wo´jcik’s scheme is a realistic scheme, all the total numbers of Alice’s bits, Bob’s bits and
Eve’s bits should be finite in his paper. This is important in pointing out the mistakes in Wo´jcik’s
paper. This can be seen later. The mutual information in Wo´jcik’s paper is only and essentially a
single-bit mutual information. This physical quantity is used inappropriately in Wo´jcik’s paper to
stand for the mutual information of the whole transmissions (multi bits), alternatively, the mutual
information of the whole transmissions (multi bits) are not worked out appropriately in Wo´jcik’s
paper. This can also be seen later. So, in this paper, first, let us give the formulae of the mutual
information of the whole transmissions and the QBERs. Incidentally, one should keep in mind that,
provided that Alice’s bits are given, the mutual information between Alice and Bob (Eve) and the
QBER in Bob’s (Eve’s) bits should be completely determined by the bits Bob (Eve) obtains.
Let J be the total number of Alice’s bits and J0 be the number of all ’0’ bits and J1 be the
number of all ’1’ bits in Alice’s bits. Obviously, J = J0 + J1. Let a0(a1) be the rate of the ’0’ (’1’)
bit in Alice’s bits, then a0 = J0/J and a1 = J1/J = 1 − a0. If an assumption that a0 = a1 = 1/2
is employed, then J0 = J1 = J/2. In this paper such an assumption is employed hereafter.
Let M be the total number of Bob’s bits and M0 be the number of all ’0’ bits and M1 be the
number of all ’1’ bits in Bob’s bits. Obviously, M = M0 +M1. Let b0(b1) be the rate of the ’0’
2(’1’) bit in Bob’s bits, then b0 =M0/M and b1 =M1/M = 1− b0.
Obviously, only if an ideal quantum channel is assumed, then M = J ; otherwise, M should be
less than J due to the channel losses. In this paper, later, J is assumed to be the effective number
of Alice’s bits which can be transmitted to Bob. In this case M = J .
Let L00 be the total number extracted from Alice’s J0 ’0’ bits and Bob’s M0 ’0’ bits in the case
that when Alice sends a ’0’ bit Bob accordingly gets a ’0’ bit by his measurement. L00 is named
as the number of the pair (0,0). Similarly, L10, L01 and L11 can be defined. Their rates can be
worked out as follows:
c00 = L00/J, c01 = L01/J, c10 = L10/J, c11 = L11/J. (1)
According to above definitions, the following relations can be built up easily:
L00 + L01 = J0 = J/2, (2)
L10 + L11 = J1 = J/2, (3)
L00 + L10 = M0, (4)
L01 + L11 = M1 = J −M0. (5)
Let Qb be the number of the wrong bits in Bob’s bits comparing with Alice’s bits. Easily, one
can obtain Qb = L01 + L10. Accordingly, the QBER in Bob’s bits can be obtained:
qb ≡ Qb/J = (L01 + L10)/J. (6)
Taking advantage of equations 1-6, the following rates can be arrived at{
c00 = (2b0 + 1− 2qb)/4, c01 = (1− 2b0 + 2qb)/4,
c10 = (2b0 − 1 + 2qb)/4, c11 = (3− 2b0 − 2qb)/4.
(7)
It seems that the values of b0 and qb can be chosen freely in the domain [0, 1], however, since
0 ≤ c00, c01, c10, c11, b0, q ≤ 1, the following limitations exist:{
1
2
− qb ≤ b0 ≤
1
2
+ qb, 0 ≤ qb ≤
1
2
;
qb −
1
2
≤ b0 ≤
3
2
− qb,
1
2
≤ qb ≤ 1.
(8)
According to the definition of the mutual information, one can obtain the mutual information
between Alice and Bob as follows:
IAB ≡ H(A : B) = H(A) +H(B)−H(A,B)
= −
1
2
log
2
1
2
−
1
2
log
2
1
2
− b0 log2 b0 − (1− b0) log2(1− b0)
+
2b0 + 1− 2qb
4
log
2
2b0 + 1− 2qb
4
+
1− 2b0 + 2qb
4
log
2
1− 2b0 + 2qb
4
+
2b0 − 1 + 2qb
4
log
2
2b0 − 1 + 2qb
4
+
3− 2b0 − 2qb
4
log
2
3− 2b0 − 2qb
4
, (9)
which is a function of b0 and qb. Once Bob finishes his measurements, then in his bits the b0 is
determined and accordingly the qb is determined provided that Alice’s bits are given. Up to now,
the above equation has established the relation between the mutual information and the QBER.
3Let us see the properties of the equation (9): (a) If qb = 0, according to the equation (8) one can
obtain b0 = 1/2. Substituting qb = 0 and b0 = 1/2 into the equation (9), one can obtain IAB = 1.
This is easily understood. Since Bob gets the whole bits correctly, it is sure for him to get the whole
information. (b) If qb = 1/2, then IAB ≡ 0 disregarding the value of b0 completely. This also can be
seen from figure 1. In fact, when Bob gets his bits simply by guess instead of his measurements, it
is possible for him to get J/2 wrong bits (i.e., qb = 1/2). In this case, he should get no information.
Incidentally, although it is very possible for Bob to get J/2 wrong bits (i.e., qb = 1/2) by guess,
there are other possibilities. (c) Substituting 1 − qb for qb in the equation (9), the equation (9)
does not change. This means that if Bob can get the mutual complementary bits of his bits he may
have the same mutual information. This can be easily seen from figure 1. The figure is symmetric
about the qb = 1/2. Specifically, in both cases of qb = 0 and qb = 1, IAB = 1. Therefore, when one
uses the mutual information as the criteria to judge how much information Bob has obtained, an
assumption that the mutual complementary bits should correspond to the same information (e.g., if
’00100’ defines a character, then ’11011’ as the former’s mutual complementary bits should defines
the same character) is employed; otherwise, such a criteria is incorrect. Since the assumption is
disadvantageous for the message transmission in reality, the mutual information is not the quantity
which is good enough to character the successfully transmitted message. By the way, the strategy
combining the mutual information with the QBER is feasible as an improvement. In addition, as
mentioned before, once Bob gets more or less wrong bits relative to J/2 by his guess, it is possible
for him to get some information responding to his naive guess. (d) For a given qb, IAB is a function
of b0, that is, it is possible that two different b0’s do not correspond to a same IAB but a same qb
(e.g. see the lines 7 and 8 in table 1), the . This means that the QBER is not a suitable quantity
in characterizing the amount of the information Bob gains form Alice.
Similarly, one can work out the mutual information between Alice and Eve. Let K be the total
number of Eve’s bits and K0 be the number of all ’0’ bits and K1 be the number of all ’1’ bits in
Eve’s bits. Obviously, K = K0 +K1. Let e0(e1) be the rate of the ’0’ (’1’) bit in Eve’s bits, then
e0 = K0/K and e1 = K1/K = 1− e0.
Let N00 be the total number extracted from Alice’s J0 ’0’ bits and Eve’s K0 ’0’ bits in the case
that when Alice sends a ’0’ bit Eve accordingly gets a ’0’ bit by her eavesdropping. N00 is named
as the number of the eavesdropping pair (0,0). Similarly, N10, N01 and N11 can be defined. Their
rates can be worked out as follows:
d00 = N00/K, d01 = N01/K, d10 = N10/K, d11 = N11/K. (10)
Let Qe be the number of the wrong bits in Eve’s bits comparing with Alice’s bits. Easily, one
can obtain Qe = N01 +N10. Accordingly, the QBER in Eve’s bits can be obtained:
qe ≡ Qe/J = (N01 +N10)/J. (11)
Assume Eve can attack all the bits, then K = J . According to the definition of the mutual
information, one can obtain the mutual information between Alice and Eve as follows:
IAE ≡ H(A : E) = H(A) +H(E)−H(A,E)
= −
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. (12)
Let us turn to point out the mistakes in Wo´jcik’s paper. First, see two obvious facts:
(i) in Wo´jcik’s paper, Bob’s QBER and Eve’s QBER are precisely 1/4. Then one would like
to ask how many wrong bits in Bob’s (Eve’s) bits provided that the total bit number M is odd
or 2I + 2. Assuming M = 201, 202, 203, whether the corresponding answers are 50.25,50.50,50.75
respectively? If so, how ridiculous they are for the numbers of the wrong bits are noninteger. It is
the wrong QBER=1/4 that leads to the ridiculous results.
(ii) According to Wo´jcik’s figure 4, one can find when the channel transmission efficiency is zero,
both Eve and Bob still can get information from Alice and Eve’s is larger than Bob’s. Another
ridiculous result!
All these have obviously shown that there are really mistakes in Wo´jcik’s paper. In fact, there
are more mistakes in his paper. These can be seen as follows. In the ping-pong protocol with ideal
quantum channel, Bob’s bits are obtained uniquely and deterministically, which are same as Alice’s.
For example, if Alice’s bits are ’100110’, then Bob gets ’100110’ after his measurements. In Wo´jcik
eavesdropping scheme, due to Eve’s attacks with help of channel losses, Bob’s (Eve’s) bits are not
unique in theory, and only after his (her) measurements his (her) bits are determined. For an
example: Let ’u’ (’s’) be Eve’s attack without (with) the symmetry operation. Assume Alice’s bits
are ’100110’ and Eve’s attacks are ’susuus’. Also Assume that the transmission efficiency η of the
quantum channel is not greater than 50%, for in this case Eve can attack also the bits. According
to Wo´jcik’s scheme, taking advantage of the following conditional probability distributions:
pu
000
= 1, pu
001
= pu
010
= pu
011
= 0, pu
100
= pu
101
= pu
110
= pu
111
= 1/4;
ps
000
= ps
001
= ps
010
= ps
011
= 1/4, ps
111
= 1, ps
100
= ps
101
= ps
110
= 0; (13)
in theory it is possible for Eve to get any one of the following batches: ’100110’, ’100111’, ’100100’,
’100101’, ’100010’, ’100011’, ’100000’, ’100001’,’101100’, ’101101’, ’101110’, ’101111’, ’101000’,
’101001’,’101010’ and ’101011’. According to equation (12), it is easy to work out the mutual
information for each batch of bits. Obviously these batches do not lead to a same value of IAE
and a same QBER (See table 1). This example denies Wo´jcik’s conclusion that the IAE is always
0.311 and the QBER is always 1/4. It is very easy to be understood that when Eve gets different
batches of bits it is quite possible for her to have different mutual information with Alice (See table
1). However, which batch of bits Eve will get on earth by his measurements can not be deter-
mined beforehand, for each one can occur with its own probability (See table 1). Only after Eve’s
measurements, one can know which one it is exactly. From table 1, one can also deny Wo´jcik’s
another general conclusion that IAE is always larger than IAB, for in some cases IAE = 0 (See
Table 1). So there must be mistakes in Wo´jcik’s calculations of the mutual information. I think it
is the confusion between the single-bit mutual information and the multi-bits mutual information
which leads to the mistakes. Hence, intuitively, the security estimation based on the wrong mutual
information in Wo´jcik’s paper is also not reliable anymore.
Let Ju(Js) be the number of Alice’s bits suffering the ’u’ (’s’) attacks, then J = Ju + Js ≡
Ju0 + Ju1 + Js0 + Js1. Further, still assume that after Eve’s ’susuus’ attacks, Eve gets her ’100110’
from Alice’s ’100110’. Then Ju0 = 1, Ju1 = 2, Js0 = 2,Ju1 = 1, N
u
00
= 1,Nu
01
= 0,Nu
10
= 0,Nu
11
= 2,
Ns
00
= 2,Ns
01
= 0,Ns
10
= 0,Ns
11
= 1,. The extracted probability distributions of the eavesdropping
5pairs (0,0),(0,1),(1,0) and (1,1) can be calculated as follows:
tu00 ≡
Nu00
Ju0
= 1, tu01 ≡
Nu01
Ju0
= 0, tu10 ≡
Nu10
Ju1
= 0, tu11 ≡
Nu11
Ju1
= 1;
ts
00
≡
Ns
00
Js0
= 1, ts
01
≡
Ns
01
Js0
= 0, ts
10
≡
Ns
01
Js0
= 0, ts
11
≡
Ns
11
Js1
= 1. (14)
They are apparently different with the conditional probability distributions:
tu
00
= pu
000
+ pu
001
, pu
01
= pu
010
+ pu
011
, tu
10
6= pu
100
+ pu
101
, tu
11
6= pu
110
+ pu
111
;
ts00 6= p
s
000 + p
s
001, p
s
01 6= p
s
010 + p
s
011, t
s
10 = p
s
100 + p
s
101, t
s
11 = p
s
110 + p
s
111. (15)
The essential reason is that the number J = 6 of the whole bits is finite. By the way, since Wojick’s
scheme is a realistic scheme, J should be finite. Generally speaking, when J is large enough, then
the extracted probability distributions may be close to the conditional probability distributions.
Only when all the J , Ju1 and Js0 are infinite, the extracted probability distributions are equivalent
to the conditional probability distributions, that is,
tu00 ≡
Nu
00
Ju0
= pu000 + p
u
001 = 1, t
u
01 ≡
Nu
01
Ju0
= pu010 + p
u
011 = 0,
tu
10
≡
Nu
10
Ju1
= pu
100
+ pu
101
=
1
2
, tu
11
≡
Nu
11
Ju1
= pu
110
+ pu
111
=
1
2
;
ts00 ≡
Ns
00
Js0
= ps000 + p
s
001 =
1
2
, ts01 ≡
Ns
01
Js0
= ps010 + p
s
011 =
1
2
,
ts
10
≡
Ns
10
Js0
= ps
100
+ ps
101
= 0, ts
11
≡
Ns
11
Js1
= ps
110
+ ps
111
= 1. (16)
Assume that Ju0 = Ju1 = Js0 = Js1 = J/4 (same hereafter), then one can obtain
e0 = K0/J = (N00 +N10)/J = (N
u
00
+Nu
10
+Ns
00
+Ns
10
)/J = 1/2,
qe = Qe/J = (Qeu +Qes)/J = (N
u
01 +N
u
10 +N
s
01 +N
s
10)/J = 1/4. (17)
Substituting e0 = 1/2 and qe = 1/4 into the equation (12), then one can obtain IAE =
3
4
log2 3 −
1 ≈ 0.189, which is different from the value Wo´jcik claims. This is easily understood. As I
have mentioned before, in Wo´jcik’s paper, the mutual information are essentially single-bit mutual
information. Since Eve knows exactly when the ’s’ operations are performed, for each bit the
mutual information can be easily worked out and really not change. However, such single-bit
mutual information is not suitable for representing the multi-bit mutual information. From my
deduction, one can see it is the inappropriate use of the mutual information which leads to the
wrong result in Wo´jcik’s paper. Accordingly, there are mistakes in Wo´jcik’s figure 4. Intuitively,
the security estimation based on the wrong mutual information in Wo´jcik’s paper is also not reliable
anymore.
To summarize, I have presented the calculations of the multi-bit mutual information and the
QBERs. A number of mistakes in Wo´jcik’s have been found and pointed out.
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Table 1 The possibility, the QBER, the rate of ’0’ bit in Eve’s bits and the mutual information
between Alice and Eve for possible batches of bits.
Eve’s bits possibility q e0 IAB
’100110’ 1/16 0 1/2 1
’100111’ 1/16 1/6 1/3 0.459
’100100’ 1/16 1/6 2/3 0.459
’100101’ 1/16 1/3 1/2 0.082
’100010’ 1/16 1/6 2/3 0.459
’100011’ 1/16 1/3 1/2 0.082
’100000’ 1/16 1/3 5/6 0.134
’100001’ 1/16 1/3 2/3 0.093
’101100’ 1/16 1/3 1/2 0.082
’101101’ 1/16 1/2 1/3 0
’101110’ 1/16 1/6 1/3 0.459
’101111’ 1/16 1/3 1/6 0.093
’101000’ 1/16 1/2 2/3 0
’101001’ 1/16 2/3 1/2 0.082
’101010’ 1/16 1/3 1/2 0.082
’101011’ 1/16 1/2 1/3 0
Alice’s bits are ’100110’. Eve’s attacks are ’susuus’.
The transmission efficiency η of the quantum channel is assumed to be not greater than 50%.
Caption
Figure 1 The mutual information between Alice and Bob as a function of q and b0. See text for
q and b0. (a) surface diagram; (b) contour diagram.
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